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I. Introduction   
The term “bounded rationality” is meant to connote the reasoning capabilities of an actor 
who, on the one hand, has a goal to achieve, and goes after his objective with an at least partially 
formed theory about how to achieve it (this is the “rationality” part of the concept), and on the 
other hand that the theory is somewhat crude, likely will be revised at least somewhat in the 
course of the effort, and that success is far from assured (this is the meaning of the “bounded” 
qualification to rationality). Both aspects of the concept seem necessary to capture what we know 
about human and organizational  problem solving, in a variety of different arenas. 
The bounded rationality concept is employed, sometimes with that name and sometimes 
without, in many places in social science research. It shows up in several strands of cognitive 
science (explicitly of course in the writings of Herbert Simon and colleagues, e.g. Newell and 
Simon, 1972). It is central in recent writings about the role of business strategies in guiding what 
firms do, and sometimes leading them into dead ends (two apt examples are Leonard-Barton, 
1992, and Tripsis and Gavetti, 2000). Many recent analyses of how engineers solve problems and 
design things fit this mold (Vincenti, 1990, is wonderful on this). And the assumption of 
bounded rationality of course lies at the heart of the evolutionary theory of economic change that 
I developed with Sidney Winter (Nelson and Winter, 1982) 
* The author is grateful to Giovanni Gavetti, Annetine Gelijns, Paul
Nightingale, and Sidney Winter for helpful comments on an early version of
this paper, and to the Sloan Foundation and the Merck Foundation for research
supportPage 4 of 36
My focus in this essay as on individual and organizational problem solving, efforts to find 
a satisfactory or a better way of doing something in a context where present practice is not 
deemed fully satisfactory. While I believe that the perspective I develop can provide quite general 
insight relevant to analysis of problem oriented search under bounded rationality, the modeling is 
tailored to suit the empirical arena where I have done most of my own work, efforts to advance 
the performance of a technology,  and in particular my current focus of that research, medical 
innovation. In the analysis that follows, search for a satisfactory or a better way of doing 
something is oriented, and limited, by a theory held by the actor. Empirical exploration of 
alternatives at any time is treated as like going down a path, which current theory suggests is 
promising, finding out where it in fact leads, and then perhaps trying another path. As a result of 
what is learned in exploration, theory may be revised. In turn this may lead to choice of different 
kinds of paths. What our explorer is able to achieve ultimately depends on the efficacy of this 
interactive learning process, and on luck. 
The model puts a spotlight on two intertwined variables. One is the ability to see and 
recognize  key path characteristics, and thus to be able to discriminate among different paths, and 
potentially to control the path one is on. The other is the ability to develop a theory, a map to 
guide exploration, based on what one has learned. The former capability is highly relevant to the 
latter. Indeed, in fields like medicine the basis for a significant improvement in practice  often is 
laid by enhanced ability to make fine grained discriminations, or a more effective way to control 
and fine tune action taking, and the improvement in understanding (theory) that this enables..   
Note that this characterization of problem solving sees the actor as both theorizing, and 
engaging in trial and error learning. Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000, and Gavetti, 2005, similarly 
stress that search tends to involve both knowledge which guides search, and fumbling.   Page 5 of 36
Recognition that both are involved leads one to see concepts that are widely invoked in the 
literature on problem solving in a somewhat different light. Thus within this framework the 
“local” of “local search” needs to be understood as theoretically or cognitively local. Similarly, 
whether a topography is smooth or rugged depends on our problem solver’s cognitive mapping. 
The “natural trajectories” idea in Nelson and Winter (1982, chap 11), and in Dosi, 1982, stresses 
the importance of theory in identifying paths that tend to lead in the direction one wants to go. 
The analysis here builds on that conceptual foundation.  
Another conceptually interesting, and very real, phenomenon that becomes clear under 
the formulation I propose is that theories need not be causally valid to be useful in guiding action 
taking. On the other hand, the practical value of a theory that is not connected with the actual 
causal forces at work may be very context specific, and holding to that theory may lead to 
disastrous  choices if the context changes. Theories that have the causal factors basically right are 
less likely to be vulnerable to such problems. 
While I believe my formulation is a particularly apt characterization of the  cumulative 
efforts to improve technology in areas where, as in medical practice, over the years there has 
been significant progress,  I also believe that it sheds light on why it seems so difficult to 
improve practice cumulatively and significantly in a number of other arenas, for example in 
education or, I would argue, business management. More generally, the formulation helps to 
illuminate some of the key reasons why progress has been so much more rapid in certain fields of 
activity than others.  
I proceed as follows. In Section II I lay out the general analytic formulation. In Section III 
I narrow the focus and explore a highly  stylized model, in order to develop concrete if abstract 
examples of some of the general analytic arguments presented earlier.  Page 6 of 36
Then, in Section IV and V I broaden the analysis, adopt a less abstract style, and reflect 
on the factors that make problem solving in a field hard, or relatively easy. The examples I use 
will be drawn mostly from the history of technology, and most of these will be concerned with 
the advance of medical know-how.  However, I also will draw contrasts with search and problem 
solving in the fields of business practice and in education. 
 
II.   The General Model 
Consider the following general problem.  Our actor faces a goal oriented task that must be 
done periodically. Each time he performs the task his objective is to get as close as possible to his 
goal. He faces a set of S paths of which he is aware and believes are open to him, that vary in 
how close they get. How close a path gets to the goal is measured by a figure of merit, M. The 
actor wants to pick a path with as high a value of M as is possible. His learning task is to come to 
identify paths with high expected M. 
The task environment may be a constant, at least for a considerable period of time, or it 
may be variable. If it is variable, what paths are best may be a function of the environmental 
state. The actor’s learning task clearly is more complicated under these latter conditions than 
when the task environment is a constant. He either needs to learn how to identify different 
contexts, as well as a set of context specific guides to action, or find a broad guide to action that 
works reasonably well in all or most contexts he will face. To facilitate coherent development of 
the main argument, for the moment, I hold off consideration of discrimination among contexts, 
and assume that our actor proceeds unaware of or unable to distinguish different contexts; later I 
will open up the analysis in this regard.  Under these restrictive assumptions our actors learning 
task, then, is to find a way of choosing paths of action, among those that he believes open to him, Page 7 of 36
that work well on average, given the possibly broad range of contexts in which he may have to 
operate.  
Each possible path is marked by the values taken on by N characteristics or attributes. 
Some of these characteristics may simply be present or not on a path; others may have a number 
of possible values. Our actor is able to see at least some of these attributes, before committing to 
a particular path, but not necessarily all of them. At any time he has a set of beliefs about what 
visible attribute values mark good paths (and may have some conjectures as to desirable values 
of attributes he presently is unable to see, but in the future might learn how to). Our actor can not 
in general control the exact path he takes, but only that that path have a set of attributes. If there 
is more than one path that has the attribute values our actor believes mark the best paths, which 
path actually gets taken is determined randomly (equal probability) across the set of paths with 
those attribute values.  
Thus what happens as a result of the actors choice is determined partly by his deliberate 
choice, and partly by chance. It is as if a choice by the actor involved picking a particular urn, 
defined by the visible attributes chosen and under control, and containing all paths with those 
markings, from which random draws are taken, with replacement (for a more extensive 
development of the “urns” model, see Nelson, 1982). If our actor keeps choosing a course of 
action with a particular set of controlled attributes, he will achieve a mean payoff. But there may 
be considerable variance. Part of that variance may be due to the fact that the paths actually taken 
vary. Part may be due to the fact that there are different context conditions that the actor does not 
notice. 
The “rationality” part of the bounded rationality characterization of reasoning in problem 
solving connotes, correctly I believe, that individual and organizational actors generally have Page 8 of 36
some reason for what they do, although in a familiar context behavior may be largely automatic. I 
will interpret the actor’s choice of paths with a particular set of attribute values, a particular urn, 
as being the result of a “theory” held by the actor. I do not want to be too constrained here in the 
interpretation of what a “theory” means. A theory about good paths may  have backing in 
scientific understanding, or it may not. It may simply reflect the actor’s experience. The theory 
may be deep and provide an explanation for why particular kinds of paths are better than others, 
or it may simply be about the nature of good paths. The empirical evidence supporting the theory 
may be strong, or weak. The theory may be no more than a hunch. In any case, the important 
thing about our actor’s theory is that it identifies the characteristics of paths that he thinks lead to 
good outcomes. 
As I indicated earlier, the analysis here is strongly motivated by my developing 
understanding of innovation in medicine. From this orientation, the particular paths can be 
interpreted as different treatments for a disease, or at least a set of symptoms. Given those 
symptoms, our actor-physician’s choice problem is to come to find paths-treatments that are 
likely to have a high figure of merit, given those symptoms. 
As the formulation is set up, there clearly is a lot of room for learning by doing. That 
learning by doing may simply come as a byproduct of doing.  However, there also generally are 
opportunities to pick a path to follow in part at least because doing so will help test or fine tune 
prevailing theory, or because such action will enable the exploration of a somewhat different 
theory. At this stage of the analysis, I do not want to get into the issue of possible trade-offs at 
any time between choosing a path which, given what the actor then believes, promises the 
highest expected figure of merit, and choosing a path that is likely to increase  knowledge, but   
at an opportunity cost in terms of expected merit this time. Later in this essay I will distinguish Page 9 of 36
between search that proceeds off-line, as in a separate R and D activity, and on-line learning by 
doing, and their often important interactions. But in this and the following section I will repress 
these complications and simply assume that search goes on as long as our actor believes that 
there is something important yet to learn.  
If there are any costs to searching, and our actor is confident that his prevailing theory is 
about as good as can be achieved, then there is no point in experimenting. However, if he has 
reason to suspect that there is something not quite right, or incomplete, about his current 
understanding, and can see ways that exploration might improve his understanding, then there is 
incentive to do such experimenting.  
Search to improve theory can be oriented in a variety of different ways. For example, in 
the actor’s mind the objective of search may be to develop a theory that discriminates among 
different path markers in a more fine grained way. Or the relevance of markers not considered 
under prevailing theory may be explored. Or, and here I loosen my earlier assumption, attention 
might be given to trying to distinguish among different context conditions. 
Given a broad orientation, there are a variety of possible search strategies. I suggest that 
the concept of local or neighborhood search can be interpreted as a particular kind of search 
strategy. The concept is based on the notion of a starting point, under our assumptions here  
associated with a particular path or set of them that have been taken as a result of a broad theory 
held by our actor, and then exploration as to whether some marginal change in orientation might 
increase expected M. My use of the term “path” to denote a course of action suggests that 
geography matters, and a theory about the characteristics of good paths might be that they tend to 
start in a particular geographical area. Under that theory, geographical proximity is a natural way 
to think of closeness or neighborhood, and local search might involve experimentally shifting Page 10 of 36
search to an area that is physically proximate to the one that had been being employed as a 
starting point. 
But a theory about the characteristics of good paths may have nothing to do with the 
geographical location of the start of the path. The broad theory may be that paths that go through 
dense woods tend to be good ones. and that starting in a grove of trees is a good indicator that the 
path will spend a lot of its course in the woods. Under that theory, our actor might think of  
attending the number of trees in the grove at the start of a path. Assume he gets close to his goal 
after taking a path with say X trees in its starting grove, and recognizes that number. He might 
then be interested in exploring whether paths with a few more or a few less trees in the grove at 
the start might yield even higher expected M. Those paths might not be nearby geographically, 
but would be “nearby” in their markers. Local or neighborhood search seems generally to be 
regarded as theory free. However, I am proposing here that notions of nearness, and similarity, 
are very much influenced by the background theory the actor has. 
Consider, for example, the concept of similarity of chemical elements. If a chemist is 
looking for an element that has many of the same reactive characteristics as the one he presently 
is working with, but which may have fewer drawbacks, he will be drawn to other elements on the 
same column of the periodic table, a similarity defined in terms of the number of electrons in the 
outer shell.  A physician prescribing for angina, who has a patient that has reacted badly to a 
particular beta-blocker, likely will try another beta-blocker. In both of these cases, what is 
similar, what is a local change, is highly “theory” dependent.  
Often the concept of neighborhood search is linked to the concept of hill climbing. The 
notion of hill climbing assumes a space of alternatives that can be connected in a chain, so that it 
is feasible for the actor to move from some initial point “A”, to some point in its neighborhood, Page 11 of 36
say “B”, where the payoff may be  higher, and if it turns out to be higher, then move from point 
B’ to point “C”, which is in the same general direction from B as B was from A, etc. Like the 
concept of neighborhood search, bill climbing generally seems to be regarded as proceeding in a 
natural physical space, and as a theory free activity. But, following the line of argument above, I 
propose that, in problem solving, hill climbing generally should not be conceptualized as 
proceeding in physical space. Thus our actor may pose the question in terms of whether the 
number of trees at the start of a path matters, and move from two trees in the grove  paths to three 
tree paths to four tree paths, etc. 
 It may turn out that, while merit changes erratically as one moves from one path to 
another that is nearby physically, average merit is smoothly related to the number of trees that 
mark the start of a path. What is a rugged topography and what is not, just as what is close and 
what is not, depends on the theoretical lenses through which one views the terrain. (Levinthal, 
1997, and Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000, have interesting models of seach on rugged landscapes). 
To return to our example in chemistry, the search for a better element to stick into a 
molecule likely would  proceed over extremely rugged terrain, in the sense that M would bounce 
around a lot,  if our molecule designer tried one element, then the one in the periodic table 
heavier than it, etc.  But the terrain might be quite smooth if the first larger element considered 
seriously was one with the same structure of the outer electron shell, then a still heavier element 
with that same configuration, etc. More generally, it is clear that in their exploration (either actual 
physical trial  or by modeling) of designs for a device, engineers try hill climbing regarding 
parameters of the design their theoretical understanding suggests are important.  
The perspective I am developing here flags attention to the fact that there may be several 
different theories that are roughly consistent with the empirical evidence regarding the Page 12 of 36
characteristics of good and bad paths. Of these theories, some may work for quite spurious 
reasons, and be quite context specific. 
Thus our actor’s theory that paths that go through the woods are on average better than 
paths that go over fields may be supported by considerable experience. But some of the paths 
through the woods go by lakes and others do not.  And in fact it may be passage by lakes that 
gives a path its good properties. The reason that paths through the woods pay off more on 
average than paths through meadows may simply be  that a much larger percentage of the former 
than the latter go by lakes. If this is learned, our actor might well be able to do better with this 
new and more accurate theory, at least if there are visible indicators that are more reliable than a 
grove of trees at the start in telling whether a path will go by a lake.  
An interesting real example is the growing perception, during the 18
th and early 19
th 
centuries, among physicians concerned with epidemics, that malodorous air, miasma, was an 
important source of contagious disease, and that cleaning up the urban environment helped to 
prevent epidemics. This “theory”, which clearly contributed to good public policies,  existed well 
before there was general acceptance of the germ theory of disease (see e.g. Porter, 1997, chap. 
13). However, when the germ theory of infections disease came to be accepted and understood, 
and discriminations made among different diseases and their carriers, policies could become 
much more focused on preventing the presence of the carriers of various kinds of diseases. 
I now want to open up an issue that has been repressed in the preceding discussion; the 
achievement of a high average M by our actor may  require ability to recognize different contexts 
and pick paths that are appropriate to each. A “by a lake” theory of the key characteristic of good 
paths may work well in a context where there are lots of lakes, and no rivers, but not be helpful 
in a context where there are no lakes.  Conversely, if rivers have the same favorable properties as Page 13 of 36
lakes, a “good paths go by a river” theory may be fine in a context where there are no lakes and 
several rivers. If our actor always is in one context or the other, he only needs to have one of 
these theories, the right one for the context. But if he sometimes is in one context and sometimes 
in the other, he needs to be able to recognize the difference and respond to it correctly.   
  Alternatively, he might do fine if he had a general theory that what counts about paths is 
whether or not they go by a body of water, and paths had visible markers that reliably signaled 
that. Coming to understand the general theory sounds both more parsimonious and deeper. 
However, if there is no reliable general marker, knowing that good paths go by some kind of 
body of water may tell our actor little about how to identify paths that go by lakes if he is in lake 
country, or by rivers if he is in river country. At the same time, there might well be reliable 
markers for whether a path goes by a lake in lake country, and others for whether a path goes by a 
river in river country, and ways that our actor can tell where he is.  In this case, holding the 
correct general theory may add nothing to our actor’s ability to choose good paths. I would like to 
argue that in many arenas of problem solving, even many that are illuminated by a formal 
science, general theory often points only very broadly towards good practice. The devil is in the 
details, and understanding of the details is won only through detailed empirical exploration 
guided only broadly by that general theory. 
The germ theory of (many) diseases clearly was an important breakthrough, and greatly 
aided efforts to find ways to deal with human disease. But there are many different varieties of 
infectious disease, and public health measures that are effective for one may not do much to stop 
another. Cholera bacteria are carried in contaminated water, and effective campaigns to stop 
cholera (and typhoid) focus on keeping the water supply clean. Malaria is carried by mosquitoes, 
and effective public health programs are focused on this vector. Page 14 of 36
These last examples highlight that in trying to make progress in an area a lot depends on 
what one can see, more generally on one’s ability to discriminate among pathways. In turn, these 
capabilities depend on the instruments and techniques one can use to see. The development of the 
germ theory of disease, and the evidence that the medical community found convincing, 
depended on instruments like the microscope, and a significant number of carefully controlled 
experiments and demonstrations. This is equally true regarding the identification of the particular 
microorganisms responsible for particular diseases, and exploration of their vulnerabilities.  
I want to highlight that in the examples here, enhanced ability to see and discriminate 
contributed to stronger ability to control what one actually was doing, the path one actually was 
on. But ability to control can be considered as a capability in its own right.  From this 
perspective, variation in the paths actually taken by our actor may simply reflect meanderings 
that, while he knows they should be avoided, he cannot always control.  Greater ability to see 
differences may have little value in problem solving if one cannot control one’s actions 
sufficiently to take advantage of enhanced ability to discriminate. However, in what follows I 
will assume that ability to discriminate, and ability to control, go together.  
In my discussion thus far I hardly have mentioned the discovery or development of new 
methods, new pathways, like the use of new antibiotics and surgical instruments that have been 
so important in the advance of the efficacy of medical practice, and in other areas of human 
activity where progress has been sustained and significant. Technological advance of this sort is 
an enormous topic in its own right and can not be dealt with generally as part of a paper focused 
on the importance in problem solving of ability to see and discriminate, and control the actions 
taken. However, I will argue later that recognition of exactly these features of problem solving 
can go a long way towards illuminating both the sources and the roles of new techniques. Page 15 of 36
In the following section I will repress the role of the development of new techniques in 
problem solving. However, these matters will be dealt with extensively in the concluding two 
sections. 
 
III. A  Specific  Example 
I present now a highly abstract version of the general analysis sketched above, for the 
purpose of making clearer some of its implications. We observe this particular example from a 
position of full knowledge of the problem facing our actor, so we can appreciate his difficulties 
with the problem, see what can lure him to false conjectures, and the ways he might be able to 
develop a good theory and course of action. In this particular case it is assumed that the context 
facing our actor is a constant, or at least is a constant over the period of time we consider in the 
formal analysis. On the other hand, one of the questions we explore is the relevance of what the 
actor has learned in this context if the context changes. 
As displayed in Figure I, there are 36 actual different paths of action. No new ones are 
introduced or discovered over the course of the analysis; there is no technological innovation 
possible in that sense. The merit of each available pathway is shown in the upper left hand 
corner, which we can see but the actor can’t until he has gone down that particular path. In this 
particular model I assume that once a path is traversed, the actor has no trouble assigning a merit 
rating. His problem is in knowing what particular path he actually took. He only knows certain 
characteristics or signs of that path.  Thus what he can see influences his ability to control what 
he actually does.  For this reason, among others, just what he is able to see matters a lot.  
I, the author, have laid out the alternative paths on an orderly grid which you, the reader, 
can see. However, our actor has no map and has no compass, and location in Euclidian space is Page 16 of 36
something he cannot fathom. On the other hand, he can see, if he pays attention, that paths, or 
their starting points, differ regarding whether they have an X mark in the middle, or a rail line 
like mark running across the bottom, or neither of these. There are other features, or finer 
features, that differentiate the alternatives, and these are displayed in Figures II and III. But at the 
start of the problem solving venture in question, our actor cannot make out these differences. 
The reader may verify that the average merit from picking a path at random is 1. If our 
actor started by randomly picking paths, it might take him some time before he pinned this down, 
because there is considerable variance. However, perhaps the variation in achieved merit in itself 
would start him thinking about whether certain identifiable features might matter, for example an 
X mark or a rail line mark. If he explored one or another of these possibilities, he would find out 
that those variables did matter. Paths marked by an X have an average merit of 15/6; paths with 
rail lines have on average a merit average of 21/8.  Either of these is a useful theory to guide 
choice, in this particular context at least. And in this context, our actor might find it difficult to 
decide which of these theories is a better guide to action, because there is not much difference 
between the average merits of the paths pointed to by the two theories. 
This is interesting because, as will become evident shortly, the “marked with an X”   
theory of high merit paths is completely spurious causally, and works in this context only by 
chance. It likely would be of no use at all if the context changed. In contrast, the “marked with a 
rail line ” theory does have a relationship with the underlying causal mechanisms. 
I note that, in the spirit of the discussion of the prior section, if our actor can only tell 
whether a path has a rail line like marker, or an X, he has limited control over the path he actually 
takes at any time. A consequence is significant variation in the values of M achieved from taking 
paths that, for all our actor knows, are the same.    Page 17 of 36
Figure II displays what our actor can see after he gets eyeglasses that enable him to see 
more clearly. One thing he now can see is that, while he missed it without glasses, some of the 
paths marked by an X also have an x, while others do not. Being able to make this discrimination 
clearly is helpful, at least in this context. Paths marked by an X but without an x have an average 
payoff of 11/3. If he can find this out by experimenting, and sticks to paths so marked, this beats 
the average he can get if he guides his choices by whether a path has a rail line mark or not. 
However, while a theory that good paths are marked by a simple X will help guide him in this 
particular context, the theory is spurious regarding true causality. 
Good glasses also enable our actor to see more finely into the markers on paths that he 
used to think were characterized by rail line markers. He now can see that these really are a set of 
connected crosses. He also can see that the set so marked seems to differ in terms of the number 
of crosses or cross bars. What he can make of that knowledge depends on how finely he can 
discriminate. If he can actually count the number of crosses or cross bars, and experimented to 
find out the relationship between average merit and number of crosses, he might be able to home 
in on paths with seven crosses, which have an average merit of 13/4, not quite as high as the 
paths marked by a simple X, but pretty close. 
However, it would not be easy to reach that understanding. There is a large number of 
paths marked by collections of crosses, and several for each number. Attempts at hill climbing 
through finding the average merit for paths with a given number of crosses and then moving up 
or down one wouldn’t work very well. First of all, there still is more than one path associated 
with any marker our actor can identify, and therefore different values of M in going down paths 
of that class. At this level of discrimination, it is average M that counts, but getting the averages 
close to right might take a number of trials. Second, the relationship between average merit and    Page 18 of 36
number of crosses is far from smooth.  The topography is rugged, when looked at from the 
perspective lent by a theory that focused on the number of crosses.. 
Now equip our actor with an even better set of glasses. He now can see, as shown in 
figure 3, that some of what he thought were crosses on different paths in fact are asterisks. He 
could then explore the merits of the paths that had some asterisks. If he had any luck, he would 
quickly come to a theory that asterisks marked good paths. The average merit of paths with 
asterisks in 21/6. If he reached this conclusion, he might then consider whether the number of 
asterisks mattered. This would be an easier task than exploring whether the number of 
undifferentiated cross like things mattered, first of all because the six paths with asterisks each 
have a different number of them; no intra class variation to make things complicated. That is, 
finer discrimination gives the actor better control of what he actually does.  And second, here hill 
climbing works. The topography is smooth. Merit goes up linearly with the number of asterisks. 
In fact, this is the only structural systematic relationship between attributes and merit in 
the set of paths. I know that because I built the model. There are six paths with asterisks.  In each 
of these merit equals the number of asterisks. The merit for the other thirty paths is either zero or 
one, half each. Any relationships between attributes other than the number of asterisks and merit 
are due to chance, or to the fact that certain attributes are partially tied to the number of asterisks. 
The particular context characterized in Figure III was achieved by scattering the paths so 
characterized within the grid more or less at random.  
It is useful to reflect a bit on the robustness of the different theories that, in our account, 
the actor used to guide his choice of paths, all theories that, in this particular context, helped him 
to achieve an average level of merit that was better than chance.  The theories relating to the 
presence of an X, which our actor could see without glasses, or the theory about the high average    Page 19 of 36
merit of paths marked by an X but without an x, which he could see with glasses, are as I stated 
earlier completely spurious causally. They are helpful in this particular environment. But lay out 
the random elements of the grid in another way, and guidance by such theories is likely to be 
worthless, or worse. 
The “marked by a rail line”, or connected cross like things, theory will provide some 
guidance in another environment, because all paths that are marked by asterisks also would be 
seen as being marked by a rail line or connected crosses, if the actor had no glasses or weak ones. 
And in most contexts, having a large number of cross like things likely would be a guide to good 
paths, because paths with a large number of asterisks are in fact good paths. 
With the vision of hindsight, you (the reader) know that the true guiding theory is simple. 
Merit equals the number of asterisks for those paths so marked, otherwise zero or one with equal 
probability. If our actor arrives at that theory, he is in good shape even if the context changed. 
However, note that within the context we have just considered, it took the development of ability 
for fine discrimination for our actor to have any possibility at all to arrive at the correct general 
theory; without that capability while our actor might develop a theory that would enable him to 
do well in the context in which he is operating, there is no way that he can achieve the correct 
theory of what determines merit. And even if he had high quality glasses, it might  be very 
difficult for him to  find the correct general theory.  Among other things, in this context there are 
other theories that provide almost as good guidance. 
But if the context changed, how well our actor would do would depend very much on the 
theory he had developed in the earlier context. 
 
IV.   On Factors that Enable Progress in Problem Solving Page 20 of 36
In this section I lower the level of abstraction and reflect on what enables difficult 
problems ultimately to be solved reasonably well. My focus here is in persistent problems 
relevant to a significant group of individuals or organizations, on which progress is made not all 
at once, but rather from a series of partial solutions that enable the goal to be approached more 
and more closely. This aptly characterizes the advance of most technologies.
I want to start by proposing that the ability to see fine grained differences, and to control 
the path taken based on fine grained discriminations, a key variable influencing the power of 
search highlighted in Section III, shows up as important in many empirical studies. While the 
point made there would seem obvious, almost trivial, there is much more than tautology here. 
Ability to see, discriminate, and reliably select and control that the actions have particular 
characteristics, is something that cannot be taken for granted. In many cases creating the 
capability to discriminate and control has been the key to becoming able to solve the problem. 
Consider, as a famous example, the inability of navigators of ships at sea to assess 
accurately their longitude, prior to the development of the chronometer. As a result, those 
responsible for choosing the ship’s path often could not judge accurately or control the 
longitudinal dimension of the path they were taking, with occasional disastrous consequences. 
The development of the chronometer enabled navigators to have much finer control over their 
ships’ actual path, given the course they aimed to take. (For the story see Sobel, 1996). In effect 
the “subset of paths” on which they might be at any time was substantially reduced. 
This was a case where, while improved ability to see and control greatly improved ability 
to pick and hold to good paths, these developments had no significant affect on broad theory. The 
importance of being able to measure longitude had been understood for a long time; only the 2121
* 
  Page 20 of 31  Page 21 of 36
ability was lacking. However, in many cases such improved abilities have led to new theories, or 
at least permitted them, which in turn led to the discovery of better practice. 
Thus prior to the development and acceptance of the microbial theory of infectious 
diseases, largely as a result of the research and publicity done by Pasteur and Koch, physicians 
had little clue regarding how to deal with such illnesses. Efforts to cure individual patients 
usually were worthless or worse. With the acceptance of microbe theory, this changed. But 
microbial theory could not have been discovered or demonstrated (although it had been 
conjectured) without instruments and techniques that enabled microbes actually to be seen. In 
turn that theory, and the observational capabilities that enabled it, set problem solving in the 
direction of identifying the particular microbes involved in various diseases, again a path 
requiring fine grained perception and control. Once the particular micro-organism was identified, 
problem solving could turn towards trying to develop an effective vaccine. While a persuasive 
theory of why vaccines often worked only came later, experience gave some strong clues as to 
how to develop a vaccine, once the offending microbe had been identified. And while risky, tests 
of the efficacy of a new vaccine generally gave sharp results. The germ theory of disease also 
provided useful focus for efforts to find or create antibiotics, but significant progress in this area 
took a long time to achieve. 
There was an interesting difference between the ability to treat individual patients and 
ability to devise public health measures for infectious diseases, prior to germ theory. The 
dominant theory that guided treatment of individual patients by many physicians was based on 
the notion that illness was the result of the balance of body fluids getting away from what it 
should be. While for some physicians this theory led to advice to patients regarding a healthy life 
style, it also often led to treatments for illness like bleeding, that usually did more harm than Page 22 of 36
good. In contrast, as I noted earlier there was a relatively widely held theory about the health 
problems caused by “bad airs” that led to various campaigns to clean up areas that were 
malodorous. In some cases this led to the elimination of various public health hazards, and 
generally led to actions that did more good than harm. This is a good example of a an invalid 
theory that in fact enabled some effective problem solving, because the factors it identified as 
relevant were often correlated with the real causes, and dealing with the correlated variables 
often  dealt with the actual culprits. Of course with germ theory, public health policy would rest 
on a new and more effective foundation. 
I have been arguing that one of the important advantages of being able to identify, 
specify, and control closely the paths of action that are taken is that one then has the possibility of 
getting useful feedback regarding efficacy. But while ability to fine tune action may be necessary 
for sharp feedback, it is not sufficient. In the model in Section III our actor had no difficulty 
assessing merit when he got to the end of a path. However, there are a wide variety of problem 
areas where, while actions can be tightly specified and controlled, feedback is not sharp or rapid. 
This is often the case in medicine. 
Areas of medical practice differ significantly in this respect. In general, one can learn 
relatively quickly if a new antibiotic works or not, although it may take more time to learn about 
possible side effects. However, with treatments that are basically intended to prevent premature 
deaths, which is usually the case with treatments for early breast or prostate cancers, it can take a 
long time before one has statistically significant data on the ages of death of a treated group, and 
a control group.  This very slow feedback regarding efficacy clearly adds to the difficulty of 
making significant progress in these areas. Page 23 of 36
Another striking feature of progress in medicine, and the evolution of technologies more 
generally, that is repressed in the model, is that achieving a goal, or a continuing improvement in 
performance, almost always is the result of work done by many different parties. There are 
exceptions. Jenner’s bet on the efficacy of using materials from cow pox as the stuff for 
vaccination for small pox was based on his access to folk wisdom, but the idea of the vaccine 
was his.  Similarly. Pasteur’s vaccine for rabies was largely his doing. But in many cases the 
development of a successful means to prevent or cure a disease has been the result of the work of 
many different people and organizations. 
The penicillin case is a good example. Here the original discovery of the antibiotic 
properties of the mold was done by one person, Fleming. The experimental work on using the 
substance as a prevention or treatment for infection was done by someone else, Florey and 
colleagues. And the development of an effective production method was done by still other 
people. There are many other similar examples in the history of medicine. In virtually all detailed 
studies of particular important inventions I know about, a history of earlier work that laid the 
basis for the invention in question is part of the story.  
Again, I want to propose that a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the ability of 
today’s problem solvers to build on the work of yesterdays’ is the ability to closely specify and 
control the paths being worked on. You can’t build on someone else’s work unless you know the 
nature of that work in a certain amount of detail, and have the ability to pick up where that prior 
work ended.  
In Sections II and III I ducked the question of just how exploration for better ways of 
doing things proceeded, while noting that it could proceed on-line or, in some cases, off-line. 
Ability to experiment, to learn, off-line obviously has major advantages. Doing experimentation Page 24 of 36
on-line involves opportunity costs, if a path other than in the set currently judged most promising 
is taken in order to explore its merit. If one tries to keep opportunity cost down by not diverging 
much from known best practice, the range of exploration is seriously constrained, and what one 
learns has to come largely as result of “learning by doing” where ability to pin down cause and 
effect relationships may be quite limited. In most of the modern technologies where advance has 
been rapid and sustained, much of the exploration and fine tuning of new paths is done off-line, 
in R and D that is separated from actual practice. 
The fact that today new medical practices, including the use of new pharmaceuticals, and 
devices,  are largely developed off-line is so familiar that it is not recognized as remarkable. Until 
recently, all advances in medical practice were achieved in exploration on-line. Jenner’s 
discovery of vaccination is a good example. While the discovery that the availability of citrus 
fruits could prevent scurvy involved a relatively controlled experiment in which different sailors 
were provided with different supplements to their standard diet, that experiment was very much 
on-line. As this example illustrates, it always was possible to experiment on a small number of 
people, with broader practice for the population as a whole learning from advertised 
experimental results. However this is very different from doing experimentation off-line, as it 
were, with application to even a small number of patients dependent on “laboratory” results. 
Indeed, prior to the mid-nineteenth century there was hardly any “laboratory” work that 
led to significant advances in medical practice. A combination of the development of the germ 
theory of disease, identification of cells as the basic building blocks of living creatures, and 
significant advances in understanding of biochemistry, changed all that. Nowadays it is expected, 
indeed required by law, that a new treatment, a pharmaceutical for example, be sufficiently well 
tested off-line, in the laboratory, or using nonhuman subjects, before actually trying it on   Page 25 of 36
humans, that the prospects that the new treatment will be effective are relatively good and the 
chances of its causing harm relatively small.  
Let me flag what by now should be obvious to the reader. The efficacy of off-line R and 
D depends on the ability to specify closely, to control, what is achieved in R and D. And it must 
be possible to take what has been learned off-line, and use it on-line with much the same results 
as was achieved in R and D.  As Paul Nightingale (2004) has argued, much of what is achieved 
in R and D is achieved under tightly controlled conditions. Thus the transfer to practice often 
involves developing shields so that the relevant aspects of practice resemble the controlled 
conditions of the R and D setting. Reflect on how much shielding from possible adverse 
environmental effects goes into the design of high tech products, like a micro-processor . 
Pharmaceuticals are protected by a outer shell, and conditions of use closely specified.  
It also is important to recognize that clinical trials still are a necessary part of the process. 
And many new treatments fail at this stage. In the language of Sections II and III, what has 
happened is that the characteristics, the markers, that suggest a path is worthwhile going down 
now take the form of results in a laboratory, or in an animal model. But there still is the need to 
go down that actual path and see where it actually ends up. 
The cases discussed in this section and earlier make it clear that effective problem solving 
often involves the enabling or creation of ways of doing things that were not feasible before, or 
not even envisaged as possibilities. Indeed, such technological innovation has been the basic 
driving force in those areas of human activity where advance had been sustained and 
cumulatively great. In some cases the key to advance is new ways of observing or assessing: the 
better glasses of Section III, the chronometer, or modern medical diagnostic equipment which, 
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other cases the advances involve new paths towards the objective: new vaccines, antibiotics, new 
surgical procedures and the apparatus that makes them possible, like heart-lung machines. To 
encompass these kinds of developments, the model of Section III would have to be enriched to 
include the creation of new paths, or the unblocking of ones which were known, in a sense, but 
not regarded as feasible.  
I have dealt extensively with innovation, in the sense of the development of significant 
new ways of doing things, in a number of other publications. Here, in the context of the 
perspective I am developing that stresses the key roles of observation and precision of action 
taking in problem solving, I want to limit my discussion to those aspects, elaborating somewhat 
on some themes I introduced at the end of Section II.. 
I want to argue that when new effective paths are opened by innovation, an important 
reason why they are effective often is that they give tight control. I noted earlier that going 
effectively from what works in the highly controlled setting of off-line R and D to actual practice 
will often require the shielding of a new artifact from the range of contingencies that might 
interfere with its efficient operation.  But more generally, controlled reliable operating 
characteristics is an important value in its own right, as I have been arguing throughout this 
essay. This certainly is so regarding new medical practices that are widely accepted as 
improvements over prior art. Thus in the development of new drugs and vaccines a considerable 
amount of attention is given to trying to optimize properties, and an important concomitant to 
fine tuning design is that the production processes need to be carefully controlled to assure that 
what is produced is what is intended to be produced.  If there were considerable variation in the 
nature of a drug with a given name, on average treatment using it would be much less effective 
than treatment using a controlled optimized version. Tests of efficacy would yield a lower mean   Page 27 of 36
M, and considerable variance. Similarly regarding new surgical procedures and the devices used 
in these, both those involved in the surgery and those implanted, like a pacemaker. While tight 
control certainly is not a sufficient condition for an innovation to be a significant advance, 
control certainly is a contributing factor, and in many cases a necessary one.  
I want to conclude this section by pointing to two areas of practice where progress has 
been very slow, and a central reason (in my view) is that the operating practices are very difficult 
to pin down in any detail. (For a more extensive discussion see Nelson, 2003.) One is education. 
Consider as an example the “phonics” method of teaching reading. The broad outlines of the 
phonics method are relatively clear. However, few schools or teachers use it in a pure form, and 
more generally the details of how reading is taught under its broad rubric differ from school to 
school, teacher to teacher, and even student to student. For this reason, among others, it is very 
hard to evaluate the efficacy of using phonics, as contrasted with other philosophies of teaching 
reading that march under a different flag.  This problem regarding educational techniques has 
been well recognized, and it has been proposed to establish tight standards for particular 
techniques. But this is easier said than done, partly because it is recognized that the imposition of 
tight standards might in many cases eliminate the possibility of context specific variation that is 
needed for efficacy in particular cases. But to the extent that broad flexibility is needed, what is 
learned though experiment and experience is going to be coarse grained.  
I would like to propose that the same thing is true of much of business practice. The M 
form, quality circles, just in time, all are terms that cover a lot of variety. Part of that variety is 
intentional, involving tailoring to fit particular contexts, but a good part stems from the fact that 
the individual actors involved are not clear themselves regarding exactly what they are doing. 
This makes for a situation in which learning, individual or collective, is not easy.   Page 28 of 36
It also is true that in both of these areas efficacy is hard to assess. But I propose that a 
considerable portion of that problem results from the fact that practices are not well identified 
and controlled, and it is very difficult and perhaps counterproductive to do much about that. 
 
V.  Remarks on the Nature and Power of the Applications Oriented Sciences 
  I want to conclude this essay by briefly discussing an apparently alternative theory of why 
progress has been so uneven across fields of human activity, and proposing that actually the 
theory I have been proposing is compatible, and deeper. That theory is that the pace of progress 
in a technical field, or on a class of problems, is dependent on the strength and rate of advance of 
the sciences that bear on that arena of problem solving. 
  In my analysis in this essay, I have highlighted the role of strong relevant theory in 
enabling effective problem solving. In many areas of problem solving, an important part of that 
theory is “scientific”.  There is good evidence that strong relevant scientific theory is a major 
factor enabling practical problem solving efforts to be effective. Several recent studies have 
shown that fields of technology that have advanced rapidly draw on strong fields of science (see 
e.g. Nelson and Wolff, 1991).  
  However, those studies also have shown that the fields of science drawn on by industry in 
efforts to advance technology tend to be the applications oriented sciences -- fields like electrical 
engineering, pathology, computer and materials science (Klevorick et al, 1995). The sciences 
here are in “Pasteur’s Quadrant”, to use a concept introduced by Donald Stokes (1997). They aim 
for understanding that will enable better practice. They may draw from other fields of science 
that have less of a practice orientation, as electrical engineering draws from theoretical physics. 
But the output of the science is designed to be useful. I do not want to deny the relevance to   Page 29 of 36
practice of theory developed without any initial interest in the guiding of practice, as Maxwell’s 
theory of electromagnetic radiation, or Einstein’s theory of special relativity. However, in most 
fields of effective practice that I know about the underlying body of theory, of science, that 
actually guides problem solving has been created in large part to enable good practice.  
I want to argue that the development of a strong applications oriented science supporting 
an arena of problem solving requires exactly that ability to see, to discriminate, to control action, 
in practice that I have been stressing above. As the examples I gave earlier indicate, the causal 
arrow here certainly goes in both directions. It may take a strong theoretical understanding to be 
able to make the appropriate discriminations among courses of action, to enable them to be 
evaluated confidently, and to permit practical paths of action to be tightly controlled. But on the 
other hand, the applications oriented sciences, the engineering disciplines, fields like materials 
science, while drawing on the more basic sciences, are basically about practice and problem 
solving relating to practice. Their strength requires that it be possible to pin down practice, 
analyze it, study how performance relates to the scientific principles of the field. (See Vincenti, 
1990 for a fascinating study of aeronautical engineering).  
Earlier I proposed that a broad theory seldom provides the detailed knowledge one needs 
to decide on appropriate practical action. Certainly the advance of engineering design, and 
medical practice, has been facilitated by the development of better broad theory. But much of 
understanding relevant to practice in these fields is at some distance away from high theory, and 
rather involves detailed knowledge of what works and what doesn’t. 
          Even in the applications oriented fields, much of scientific research proceeds off-line. As I 
noted earlier, effective off-line R and D requires that what is learned in an artificial, and 
generally highly simplified, context indicates what will work on-line. For this to happen, on-line   Page 30 of 36
operation may need to be strongly controlled. But in some fields, this may not be possible. When 
it is not, there inevitably is going to be a disjunction between what goes on in research, and what 
goes on in practice. Or, to put it another way, the “science” may not be very useful to the advance 
of practice. 
I am arguing that, while significant advance of a technology requires a strong underlying 
body of relevant science, the development of a strong field of underlying science depends on 
whether the technology can be tightly specified and controlled, and evaluated. I do not think this 
fact is sufficiently appreciated  
Thus many thoughtful people have proposed that the slow pace of advance in educational 
practice could be increased significantly if more R and D were allocated to that objective, 
particularly if the underlying sciences could be improved as a result of more resources dedicated 
to that purpose. But for decades it has been well documented that educational practices that seem 
to work well in an experimental setting do not seem to transfer very well to regular classrooms. 
Partly this is an accuracy of copying problem, that is virtually inevitable when a practice can be 
described only in a coarse grained way. It has been proposed that R and D would be more 
effective if what was tried in an experimental setting were more closely specified and controlled, 
and copied more tightly. But for reasons I discussed above, this is more easily proposed than 
done.  
It also has been proposed that if we had a better theory of how children learn, both off-
line experiment and on-line practice would go better, and that the returns to more basic research 
funding here could be considerable. The first part of that proposal certainly is true, but the second 
part may be dubious. It is quite unlikely that we can learn much about how children learn in their 
natural world from even a strong theory of how children learn in a carefully controlled   Page 31 of 36
experimental setting. Perhaps the reason that, except for a few broad generalizations, we don’t 
have a sharp simple theory of how children learn in their natural world, or in school, is that this is 
very complicated, and different children learn in different ways, and those ways may be very 
context specific. The scientific methods that have been so effective when the structures studied 
can be closely controlled don’t work very well when they cannot.  
It is my strong impression that a very similar situation obtains regarding business 
practice. To my knowledge, there is not much in the way of experimental laboratories where pilot 
versions of proposed new practices, or changes from prevailing practice, are experimented with 
before trying these out on-line in real time. It is well recognized, I think, that the kinds of 
experiments that social psychologists do that seem to hint at ways to improve practice are usually 
so simplified relative to the actual context that only a little can be learned from them. More 
generally, basic theory in this area strikes me as a long distance away from pointing clearly to 
ways to improve practice. 
In this essay I have been trying to point out the strong connections between the 
effectiveness of problem solving in a field, the strength of the theory that guides problem solving, 
and the ability to observe evaluate and control practice. In the contemporary world, the 
applications oriented sciences are an important part of this dynamic system. But the causal 
arrows go in more complex ways than proposed implicitly by those that advocate that supporting 
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